Intention, meaning, theory of crime, and Wittgenstein's perspective

Abstract

This article points out Vives Antón’s meaningful conception of action in order to assess its implications for the crime theory, particularly regarding the concept of intent (dolo). The public character of language is explored as a way of satisfying the requirement of the materiality of action, thereby serving to strip it of psychologistic elements. Therefore, first this article examines the problem of intent, showing that the establishment of the mental universe as the source for determining the meaning of action renders it impracticable to distinguish between different intentional actions and entails treating intent as having a psychological character. Subsequently, the connections between Wittgenstein’s practical conception of meaning and Vives Antón’s meaningful conception of action are examined, with special attention to the idea of intention. The observable character of action is shown to be fundamental to the preservation of democratic values inherent in criminal law. However, the article concludes that this is not sufficient to sustain a humanistic perspective in criminal law, since it is not enough to regard the agent merely as the subject of the action; rather, the agent must be treated as a human person, which is not achieved when their interiority is annulled.